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ABSTRACT
The Afghan Constitution and the Afghan Criminal Procedure Act
(“ACPA”) authorize Afghanistan’s President to grant pardons or reduce
criminal punishment. However, the Afghan Constitution and ACPA do
not specify a method or mechanism for how Afghanistan’s President
may exercise his power. As a result, Afghanistan’s President has been
granting pardons through pardon decrees.
The Afghanistan
Constitution and ACPA’s broad language has allowed corruption and
enabled the President to undermine the judiciary. This article
recommends for Afghanistan’s government to amend its constitution
and ACPA. The amendments should formalize and specify the method
and mechanisms for the President’s pardon power; thereby promoting
respect for the rule of law and the judiciary. This article also proposes
for Afghanistan’s government to establish an independent pardon board
to review petitions and recommend eligible requests to the President.
This article suggests that Afghanistan’s pardon procedures
combine the methods used by Iran and Washington State. These
methods are demonstrated in sources such as the Iranian Code, the
Revised Code of Washington, and the Bylaws of the Washington State
Clemency and Pardon Board. This amalgam of approaches would be
both practical and appropriate for Afghanistan’s socio-political context,
striking a balance between progressive Western methods and an Islamic
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Republic’s successful methods.
This article also explains
Afghanistan’s current laws relating to presidential pardon power and
exposes how the current system leads to corruption and the pardon’s
misuse. Next, the article will discuss how Iran and Washington State
regulate their pardon power. In analyzing Iran and Washington State’s
methods, the article will suggest specific amendments to Afghanistan’s
laws. These specific amendments would (1) modify the President’s
pardon power, (2) limit the scope of this power, (3) establish an
independent board that restricts the pardon power, and (4) authorize this
board to recommend pardons or punishment reductions to
Afghanistan’s President. Finally, this article will address the potential
criticisms and challenges to its proposed model, such as limiting the
presidential and executive power and authority.
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INTRODUCTION
Afghanistan’s government has released many criminals convicted
of various heinous crimes. 1 Such release was done through several
presidential pardon decrees and Afghanistan’s peace agreement with
Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (“HIA”), 2 which translates to the
1. Jawid Hassanzada, 198 Zendani Hezb-i-Isalmi Az Zendan Hai Pul-i-Charkhi
Wa Bagram Hazad Shodand [198 HIA Prisoners were Released from Afghanistan’s
Pul-e-Charki and Bagram prisons], AZADIRADIO.COM (June 14, 2018)
https://da.azadiradio.com/amp/29290406.html [hereinafter Zendani Hezb-i-Islami].
2. Id.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019

3

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2019], Art. 3
Isar camera ready (Do Not Delete)

5/7/2019 10:03 AM

300 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
Afghanistan Islamic Party. Undoubtedly, Afghanistan’s government
released criminals because of its relationship with the HIA or
individuals who will support President Ashraf Ghani in the next
election. For example, President Ghani gave a “full pardon” to HIA’s
armed group commander, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and HIA’s so-called
“criminal members,” who allegedly support President Ghani.
Hekmatyar and other HIA members allegedly killed many Afghan
citizens, including Kabul University law professor, Hamida Barmaki,
her four children, and husband. 3 Since then, the Afghan government has
signed a peace agreement that has pardoned 473 HIA members,
releasing them from the Pul-e-Charkhi prison, the Bagram prison, and
other provincial prisons. 4 Further, the Afghan government promised to
release more than 2,500 other HIA prisoners, all of whom were
allegedly expected to support President Ghani. 5 Thus, Afghanistan’s
President (the “President”) has regularly or usually released many
convicted prisoners through presidential pardoning decrees at different
occasions every year. 6
Part I of this article argues that the HIA peace agreement and the
governing Afghan laws do not adequately define the circumstances
where the President can legally and morally exercise the pardon power.
Without specific procedures and mechanisms outlining the President’s
power, corruption and political abuses will continue, undermining the
judiciary’s authority to determine punishments for convicted criminals.
The problems of corruption and political abuses through the
President’s pardon power are largely attributable to the lack of
specificity in Afghanistan’s pardon procedures.
In particular,
Afghanistan’s Constitution and the Afghan Criminal Procedure Act
3. Anisa Shahid, Khanawad Hai Qurbaneyan Hamla Hai Hezb-i-Islami Az
Hokomat Adalat Mekhahand [The Families of the Victims of the Hizb-i-Islami
Attacks
Demand
Justice],
TOLO
NEWS
(May
1,
2018)
https://www.tolonews.com/fa/afghanistan/ﺧﺎﻧﻮاده%E2%80%8C-ﻗﺮﺑﺎﻧﯿﺎن-ھﺎی
ﺣﻤﻠﮫ%E2%80%8Cﻣﯽ-ﻋﺪاﻟﺖ-ﺣﮑﻮﻣﺖ-از-اﺳﻼﻣﯽ-ﺣﺰب-ھﺎی%E2%80%8Cﺧﻮاھﻨﺪ.
4. Zendani Hezb-i-Islami, supra note 1.
5. See 260 Zendani Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar Az Zendan Hazad Shodand [260
HIA prisoners were released from Prison], ETILAATROZ.COM (June 14, 2018)
https://www.etilaatroz.com/62014/
6. QANUNI EJRAATI JAZAI [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT], THE OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 1132, 1393 [2014], art. 354 [hereinafter 2014 Criminal
Procedure Act].
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(“ACPA”) authorize the President to reduce sentences or pardon
convictions. 7 However, the language in both sources are broad, failing
to specify the method, procedures, or mechanisms for the President to
exercise his pardon power. 8 As a result, the President has been
unrestrained in using presidential decrees for granting pardons or
reducing sentences. The discretionary nature of this pardon power and
process can lead to corruption, which enables circumvention of
accountability and encroaches on judicial power. To address this
problem, this article recommends for Afghanistan to amend its
constitution and ACPA. The amendments would emulate jurisdictions
where clemency statutes and rules are clear, which would effectively
prevent corruption and political abuse.
Part II of this article suggests that Afghanistan’s pardon procedures
combine the methods used by Iran and Washington State. These
methods are demonstrated in sources such as the Iranian Code, the
Revised Code of Washington, and the Bylaws of the Washington State
Clemency and Pardon Board. This amalgam of approaches would be
both practical and appropriate for Afghanistan’s socio-political context,
striking a balance between progressive Western methods and an Islamic
Republic’s successful methods. Iran and Washington State’s methods
are good examples because they are aligned with international
standards of good governance.
In Iran, pardon requests are reviewed by a five-judge committee in
Tehran and a provincial committee in each province. 9 If either
committee approves a request finding the applicant eligible, then the
pardon is proposed for confirmation from the Supreme Court to the
Islamic Revolution Leader, Rabar-e Enqelab Islami. 10 Specifically, the
respective committee first examines all of the documents contained in
7. QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN], THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64 § 18. A pardon
forgives a defendant of a crime, while commutation reduces a defendant’s sentence.
BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1286-87 (10th ed. 2014).
8. See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN],
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64 § 18; see also
2014 Criminal Procedure Act supra note 6, art. 348.
9. Hahin Namae Kamesyoun Haf wa Takhfif Majazat Makumen [Regulation
of the Pardoning and Reducing the Punishment of Convicts] Tehran 1387 [2008]
(Iran) arts. 2-4. [hereinafter 2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation].
10. Id. art. 15.
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the petition to pardon or reduce punishment. 11 During this stage, the
committee must determine whether the petitioner has been
rehabilitated, and whether the pardon or punishment reduction is
beneficial for society and the government. 12 Then, the Supreme Court
supervises, provides oversight, and prevents further injustice. 13
Like Iran, Washington State follows procedures that add structural
safeguards to the pardon process. There, the Clemency and Pardon
Board hears a petitioner in a regular or special hearing process before
recommending a pardon to the Governor. 14 This approach works well
in Washington State because its State Constitution, Revised Code, and
Clemency and Pardon Board Bylaws use clear language. Washington’s
laws clearly define each officials’ authority and responsibilities and
describe how a convict may seek a pardon or punishment reduction. 15
Similar to Iran’s model, experienced professionals review and consider
the special circumstances of each Washington State pardon petition.
These professionals determine whether a convict has been rehabilitated
and is ready to rejoin the community. 16 In addition, Washington State
publicly reviews pardons and punishment reductions. 17 By sharing
pardon reviews to the public, Washington State reinforces the finding’s
accountability and reliability, promotes transparency, and prevents
corruption.
Pardon procedures should include characteristics from Iran and
Washington State’s models. This article emphasizes that Afghanistan
should carefully protect judiciary independence by incorporating Iran
and Washington’s procedures, which avoids undermining judicial
decisions.

11.
12.
13.
14.

2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2,4,15
Id. art. 24.
Id. art. 30.
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, BYLAWS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, arts. 1 §1.02, 3 § 3.01-3.02 (Mar. 22, 2011).
15. Id. art. 2 §2.05-2.07.
16. 2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2
17. STATE OF WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Washington State
Clemency
&
Pardons
Board
Policies
3
(2012)
at
5.
https://www.digitalarchives.wa.gov/GovernorGregoire/clemency/documents/policie
s.pdf. [hereinafter Washington Clemency & Pardons Board Policies]; Bylaws of
Clemency and Pardons Board, supra note 14, at art. 3 § 3.01.
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To support this claim, this article describes Afghanistan’s current
pardon laws and procedures, and describes how corruption leads to
misuse of pardons. Then, this article accounts for Afghanistan’s current
political climate, which includes the tensions caused by the National
Unity Government, the roles and powers of each branch, and how these
branches relate to the President’s pardon power. Next, this article
explains how the current Afghan regime approaches the pardon
process; an approach that is susceptible to and has been used to
perpetuate corruption. The following sections discuss and compare
how Iran and Washington State handle the same issues. Those sections
will then examine and critique Iran and Washington’s procedures for
the purpose of determining a legal reform model for Afghanistan.
Part III of this article also suggests specific amendments to the
ACPA and Afghanistan’s Constitution. The amendments specifically
propose for the creation of explicit provisions that define the President’s
authority and a statute establishing an independent pardon board and
process. Additionally, these amendments would empower a pardoning
board to promulgate regulations that implement the process. The
proposed board would be charged with drafting procedures for issuing
pardons and reducing sentences. These procedures should clarify who
can request the pardons and under which circumstances to approve
pardons. Finally, this article will address the potential criticisms and
challenges to its proposed model, such as limiting the presidential and
executive power and authority.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PRESIDENT’S PARDON POWER IN
AFGHANISTAN
A. Peace Agreement with Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan
From 2001 to 2016, HIA fought against Afghanistan’s government
in an armed conflict before reaching a peace agreement. 18 During that
period, Afghanistan’s government negotiated a peace agreement with
18. Nesar A. Khelwatgar, Dornomai Seyasee Gulbuddin Hekmatyar [Political
Perspective of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar], SALAM WATANDAR (Dec. 11, 2018)
https://swn.af/uzbeki/Article.aspx?a=43409; Mohammad Q. Erfani, Sulh Ba
Hekmatyar Che Tasire Bar Hawzai Afghanistan Gozashta? [How Did Peace with
Hekmatyar Affect the Situation in Afghanistan?], BBC NEWS (Sept. 3, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/persian/amp/afghanistan-45397256.
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the HIA but failed. 19 Surprisingly, after the 2014 election, the armed
HIA group accepted the peace request and began negotiating with
Afghanistan’s government. 20 In September 2016, after two years of
negotiation, HIA and Afghanistan’s government finally signed a peace
agreement. 21
Under Article Five of the Peace Agreement, Afghanistan’s
government promised to ask the United States and United Nations to
remove HIA’s leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and other members of his
party from the international “blacklist” and sanctions list. 22 Eight
months after the Afghan government committed to and signed the
agreement, Hekmatyar returned to Nangarhar and Kabul. 23 Since then,
Hekmatyar’s political party has participated in preliminary elections
and Hekmatyar has been preparing to participate in next year’s
presidential election. 24
In Article Eleven of the peace agreement, Afghanistan’s
government promised to release only the HIA prisoners “who have not
committed criminal crimes and there would be no personal claims by
certain individuals against them.” 25 However, recent reports show
Afghanistan’s government released 463 HIA prisoners who were
25F

19. Aimal Faizi, Afghans Must Support Peace Deal with Hekmatyar,
ALJAZEERA (Oct. 16, 2016) https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/indepth/opinion/
2016/10/afghans-support-peace-deal-hekmatyar-161013141501350.html.
20. Hekmatyar to Surface Once Peace Deal is Enforced: HIA, PAJHWOK
AFGHAN NEWS (Jan. 5, 2017). https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/01/05/hekmatyarsurface-once-peace-deal-enforced-hia.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Jennifer Hauser & Ivan Watson, Afghan Warlord Returns to Kabul After
Nearly 20 Years, CNN (May 9, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/04/asia/afghanwarlord-hekmatyar-returns-to-kabul/index.html.
24. Hamed Nazari, Hekmatyar Says His Party Will Elect Next President, TOLO
NEWS (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/hekmatyarsays-his-party-will-elect-next-president.
25. Mohammad Ameen Karim, Full text of Agreement between the Government
of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan & Hezb-e-Islami of Afghanistan Led by Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, CTR. FOR RES. & SECURITY STUD. (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://crss.pk/story/full-text-of-agreement-between-the-government-of-islamicrepublic-of-afghanistan-goira-hezb-e-islami-of-afghanistan-led-by-gulbuddinhekmatyar/ [hereinafter Full Text of Peace Agreement with HIA].
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convicted of various crimes. 26 Following the prisoners’ release,
“human rights organizations criticized the government for agreeing to
the move stating that the political prisoners had been involved in
insurgency incidents that killed civilians.” 27 Throughout the year, the
President regularly releases convicts through pardon decrees 28 without
applying procedures and examining whether they are no longer a danger
to society. 29
B. The Legal Landscape of the Pardon Power
The President’s current pardon power enables corruption because
his power goes unchecked. Afghanistan’s Constitution and the ACPA
fail to adequately describe the methods or mechanisms for issuing
pardons. 30 Article 64 §18 in Afghanistan’s Constitution provides the
President with pardon power by stating he shall exercise it under the
law’s provisions. 31 The ACPA does not contain any provisions
specifying the procedure or mechanisms allowing the President to
implement his pardon power. 32 Therefore, this broad language leaves
the door open for the President to issue pardons without a mechanism
to check him.

26. 75 Uzwe Hezb-e Islami Hekmatiyar Az Zendan Pul-e Charkhi Hazad
Shodand [75 members of Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party prisoners were released from
Pul-e
Charkhi
Prison],
BBC
NEWS
(Jan.
11,
2018),
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-42634528
27. Govt Releases 75 Hizb-e-Islami Prisoners from Kabul Prison, TOLO NEWS
(Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/govt-releases-75-hizb-eislami-prisoners-kabul-prison.
28. The Afghan Criminal Procedure Act authorize the president to grant
pardons or reduce punishments in 5 specific events, like Independence Day.
29. See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, arts. 348, 354.
30.
See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64
§ 18; 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 348.
31.
See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64
§ 18.
32. See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 348.
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1. The Pardon Power Under Afghanistan’s Constitution
Article 64 § 18 in the 2004 Afghanistan Constitution gave the
President the power to “[r]educe and pardon penalties in accordance
with the provisions of the law.” 33 The vague phrase, “provisions of the
law” suggests Afghanistan needs to establish a framework to exercise
the Article 64 §18 authority. There is still no current statute that
specifically clarifies or legalizes the implementation of the pardon
power. Without clear legal guidance, Afghanistan’s President used
pardons to release or reduce the punishment of various prisoners
through presidential pardon decrees, which are usually drafted by the
ministry of justice. 34
From 2001 to 2004, Afghanistan’s judicial system used the
Criminal Procedure Act of 1964. 35 Then, in 2004, the government
enacted the Interim Criminal Procedure Act for Courts, using it
simultaneously with the Criminal Procedure Act of 1964. 36 Both had
loopholes and shortcomings because neither responded to the existing
problems with the Presidential pardon power. Additionally, both laws
did not have clear procedures restricting the President’s power or the
manner of its exercise. As a result, the President broadly interpreted
the Constitution’s Article 64 § 18, using it to implement his pardon
power through presidential pardon decrees.
In 2014, the legislature made a few minor changes to the
President’s pardon power with the ACPA. 37 One change slightly
shortened the list of crimes that would make a criminal eligible for
pardons or punishment reduction. 38 These changes will be further
discussed below.
33.
See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64
§ 18.
34. Moqarara-e Tanzem Ejraat Wa Fahalit hai Wezart-e-Adlia [Regulation of
the Procedure and Activities of the Ministry of Justice] 1420/1378 [1999] (Afg.),
http://moj.gov.af/fa/page/7943/9493.
35. See QANUNI EJRAATI JAZAI MOHAQAT BARAI MAHAKEM [INTERIM
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE FOR COURTS] art. 98, THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
AFGHANISTAN 820, 1382 [2004] (Afg.).
36. See id.
37. See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, arts. 348-354.
38. Id.
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2. Pardon Power Under the Afghan Criminal Procedure Act
ACPA’s Article 348 confirms the President’s pardon power
through a pardon decree. 39 Although ACPA provides the President
power through presidential decrees, it limits the power’s scope. 40 For
example, ACPA’s Article 350 states the President can no longer issue
a pardon for all crimes. 41
However, ACPA is flawed, because it does not specify procedural
mechanisms for the execution of presidential decrees. 42 Article 348
states, “[a] pardon shall be carried out by the decree of the president
and based on the decree some or all of the final punishments of the
convicted person shall be dismissed or shall be reduced to a lighter
punishment as anticipated by the law.” 43 These deficiencies exist
because the legislature lacked experienced drafting specialists, who are
knowledgeable about drafting effective laws and the legal complexities
of pardon decree legislation. Such legal complexities require laws to
have specific implementation methods. Further, non-governmental
organizations generally propose or draft laws, but such organizations
also lack the institutional knowledge to draft laws that fit Afghanistan. 44
Notably, ACPA grants the President broad authority. Article 348
§ 2 states, “[a] pardon shall not dismiss consequential and
complementary punishments and security measures[,] and
consequences of criminal charges[;] and does not affect previously
applied punishments unless the issued pardon decree states
otherwise.” 45 The clause, “unless the issued pardon decree states
otherwise,” gives the President broad authority to pardon convicted
criminals or commute sentences that have already been implemented.
The broad nature of the President’s authority can enable corruption
and political abuse. For instance, ACPA authorizes the President to

39. See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 348 (1).
40. Id. art. 350.
41. Id.
42. Id. art. 348 § 1.
43. Id.
44. Qudratullah Ahmadi, , Negai Ba Hamalkard NGO ha Dar Afghanistan [ A
Look at the Performance of NGOs in Afghanistan], THE DAILY AFG. MA (July 13,
2011), http://www.dailyafghanistan.com/opinion_detail.php?post_id=121657.
45. See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 348 (2).
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issue a pardon for “previously applied punishments.” 46 During the
elections this power allows each presidential candidate to make various
commitments to their followers by pardoning previous violations in
exchange for votes.
Despite these flaws, the ACPA limits the President’s pardon power
through the “preservation of [the] rights of others” 47 and the restrictions
that prevent the President from pardoning specific crimes, like Hudud,
Qesas, Deyyat, 48 intentional murder, kidnapping for ransom,
administrative corruption, drug trafficking, recitivism, and other crimes
determined by the President. 49 ACPA establishes some exceptions on
the above restrictions and states the following:
Commuting the imprisonment punishment of [those convicted]of the
crimes set forth in subparagraphs (1 and 2) of paragraph (2) . . . may
be commuted if, in [the crime of] murder, the . . . victim[‘s heirs]
waive the convict’s punishment, and, in [the crime of] kidnapping,
the property or benefit obtained is returned to the victim. 50

Moreover, under paragraph 4, the ACPA clarifies paragraph 2 and
states, “[c]ommuting the punishment of convicts of the crimes set forth
in paragraph (2) observing the provision of paragraph (3) of this Article
shall not exceed ¾ of the punishment.” 51
Although the ACPA allows for the pardon or reduction of
punishment for convicted prisoners, it did not specify a method for the
President to follow in issuing pardons. 52 Similarly, the ACPA created
another problem by allowing the President to pardon previouslysanctioned offenses. 53 The ACPA states the pardon decree cannot
affect a past punishment unless otherwise decided by the presidential
pardon decrees. 54
46. Id.
47. Id. art. 349.
48. Id. art. 350. The pardon of Deyyat is restricted unless the victim does not
have an inheritor.
49. See id. art 350 §§ 1-2.
50. Id. art. 350 § 3.
51. Id. art. 350.
52. Id. art. 348.
53. See id. art. 348.
54. See id.
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This Article raises another issue about the difference between
“pardon” and “restoring prestige” in the ACPA. Under ACPA’s article
352, when an individual requests expungement of his criminal record,
the “primary court” that first convicted that individual has authority to
issue an order restoring prestige. 55 In contrast, a pardon can dismiss or
reduce “some or all of the final punishments of the convicted person,”
which is entirely different from restoring prestige. 56 A pardon usually
affects the current punishment, not the punishment that has already
been implemented. By refusing to amend Article 350, the Afghan
Government not only increases the President’s authority but also
creates a conflict with ACPA’s Article 362.
Although the ACPA specifies the crimes for which the President
can exercise his pardon power, it provides no mechanism or method for
implementation. In practice, this lack of guidance leaves room for
abuse of power. Further, while the President usually releases prisoners
at an event expressly listed in the ACPA, the ACPA does not specify
who should draft the pardon decree or what factors the drafters should
consider. This part of the Article focuses on explaining the pardoning
decree’s drafting process and the different occasions in which the
President typically exercises this power.
Today, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with the
President’s office, typically drafts a pardon decree and sends it to the
President for a final signature. 57 Each presidential pardon decree
establishes a committee at the central and provincial levels of
government to determine which prisoners are eligible for a pardon
decree. Each committee usually consists of prosecutors, justice
department representatives, members of the human rights office, police
officers, and a civilian representative. 58
According to a pardon decree, the central committee is authorized
to list eligible prisoners for reduced sentences or pardons. 59
Afterwards, the central committee sends the list to the President for

55. See id. art. 352.
56. Id. art. 348.
57. See Moqarara-e-Tanzem Ejraat, supra note 34.
58. Office of the President, Pardon Decree, OCS.GOV. AF, 1395 (Dec. 11,
2016), https://ocs.gov.af/dr/decree_details/185 (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
59. Id.
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approval. 60 If the President approves the list, the Attorney General has
to implement the decree and send the implementation report to the
President’s office. 61 According to the ACPA, the President can use his
or her pardon power on certain occasions or at special events, as
discussed below. 62
Under ACPA’s Article 354 , the Presidential should only grant
pardon or punishment reduction decrees on special events. 63 The
President may grant pardons in the following five events: (1) the
Prophet Mohammad’s birthday celebration; (2) Eid-e Ramazan; (3)
Eid-e Qurban; (4) the victory of Afghan People’s Jihad; and (5) the
Afghanistan Independence Day. 64 These occasions have primarily
been chosen based on religious guidance, rules, and national
significance. According to the Holy Quran’s provisions, Allah
preferred pardon and forgiveness over revenge and punishment.65
During the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Supreme Council’s recent
meeting, the Attorney General suggested an increase in the number of
special events when the President can grant pardons. 66 The Attorney
General wanted to increase the number of events to be consistent with
international special occasions and have harmony with other
countries. 67 He argued this decision would enable the President to grant
pardons or forgiveness to foreign prisoners, and thus would allow the

60. Recently, the President authorized the Attorney General to approve the list
of eligible prisoners who are convicted for less than five years imprisonment. Office
of President, The Decree of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on
the Rebate and Amnesty for the Prisoners and Prisoners on the Occasion of the Feast
of Said al-Fitr, OCS.GOV, AF (2018), https://ocs.gov.af/dr/decree_details/5.
61. See Office of the President, Pardon Decree, supra note 58.
62. See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 354.
63. Id. art. 354 §§ 1-5.
64. Id.
65. THE HOLY QURAN 2:178.
66. Recently, the Attorney General has suggested more event to grant pardon.
Office of President, The Session of the Justice and Judicial Committee of the Cabinet
was Held, OCS.GOV.AF (July 2018), https://vpo.gov.af/-ﻗﻀﺎﯾﯽ-و-ﻋﺪﻟﯽ-ﮐﻤﯿﺘﮫ-ﺟﻠﺴﮫ
9-ﺑﺮﮔﺰار-ﮐﺎﺑﯿﻨﮫ/.
67. Id.
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Afghan government to ask other countries to reciprocate for Afghan
citizens. 68
The last paragraph of Article 354 also authorizes the president to
grant pardons on other occasions based on his discretion. 69 These are
called “special decree pardons.” This broad power provides the
President with discretion to pardon anyone on any occasion. For
example, on March 8, 2018, President Ghani granted a pardon decree
under this authority, releasing at least sixty-eight prisoners in Kabul. 70
Another example occurred when Ghani entered into the peace
agreement with HIA and committed to release all prisoners with HIA
ties. 71
C. Abuse of the Pardon Power
By allowing broad discretion over the issuance of pardons, Afghan
law enables the President to abuse his authority—an outcome that likely
occurs in a corrupt political climate. This section examines the
dynamics of corruption and exposes how the President or other officials
can abuse their power through the pardon procedure.
1. Political Corruption
In a country like Afghanistan where government organizations are
weak or nonexistent, corruption has ample opportunity to undermine
good governance, corrode official procedures, and interfere with
government accountability. The judiciary system strongly feels this

68. Office of the President, Jalse Shorai Hakemeyat Qanon Wan Mobareza
Halee Fasad Adary Ba Reyasat Rahis Jomhor Ashraf Ghani Barguzar Shod [The
Supreme Council for the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption was convened by President
Ghani], OCS.GOV.AF (June 24, 2018), https://president.gov.af/fa/news/628628.
69. See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 354(6).
70. 68 Tan Mahjozen, Mahboseen Zan Dar Zendan Honasia Pul-e Charkhi
Kabul Wa Markaz-e Esla Wa Tarbia Atfal, Mawred Haf Wa Takhfif Qarar Greftand
[68 Convicted Women who were Detained in the Pul-e-Charkhi Prison of Kabul and
Juveniles’ Detention and Rehabilitation Center, Pardoned and Reduced Punishment],
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE (Mar. 8, 2018), http://ago.gov.af/fa/news/437012.
71. See 75 Uzwe Hezb-e Islami, supra note 26.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019

15

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2019], Art. 3
Isar camera ready (Do Not Delete)

5/7/2019 10:03 AM

312 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
corruption. As explained above, officials have consequently abused the
pardon power and committed political corruption. 72
Corruption is often defined as the abuse of public power or
authority. 73 In particular, political corruption is generally defined as
the abuse of political power by government leaders or officials to
maintain their power and authority. 74 Even though officials can use
their power for other purposes, their abuse of power is not necessarily
political corruption, because political corruption’s main purpose is
maintaining political power. 75
The legal and illegal actions of government officials in Afghanistan
are difficult to differentiate, because Afghan laws provide officials with
many broad or ill-defined powers. For instance, when the Afghan
Government signed a peace agreement with the HIA in September
2016, the President made a commitment to release HIA prisoners
through presidential pardon decrees. 76 These decrees were signed
despite the procedural deficiencies in the existing pardon laws.
Although the HIA peace agreement was intended to provide peace and
security in Afghanistan, the President seemingly had the ulterior motive
of gaining HIA support in next year’s election. The President and the
Afghan government’s actions indicate they are trying to weaken
political opponents and make themselves stronger. In several cases,
President Ghani has dismissed, arrested, and imprisoned his political
opponents, particularly government officials who did not support him.77
For example, President Ghani dismissed Atta Mohammad Noor, the
powerful governor from the Balkh province, because he was important
75F

72. See generally Sorat Jals-e Shomara 12 Sale 1396 Shorai Hali Hakemeyat
Qanon Wa Mobareza Halia Fasad-e Adare [Minutes of Meeting # 12 of Year 1396
of Supreme Council for the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption] (Feb. 13, 2018),
http://www.aop.gov.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Minutes-of-Meeting-12.pdf.
73. Inge Amundsen, Political Corruption: An introduction to the Issues, 32,
(CMI Working Paper WP 1999:7), https://www.cmi.no/publications/1040-politicalcorruption.
74.
USLEGAL, Political Corruption Law and Legal Definition,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/political-corruption/ (last visited Apr. 12. 2018).
75. Id.
76. See generally Full text of Peace Agreement with HIA, supra note 25.
77. Eisa Khan Ayoobi, Ashraf Ghani: ‘Philosopher King’ or Ethnonationalist,
AL JAZEERA (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ashraf-ghaniphilosopher-king-ethnonationalist-180201144845423.html.
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in securing the region. 78 Moreover, Afghan Special Forces recently
captured an Uzbek commander, Nezamuddin Qaisary, who fought
alongside the government against the Taliban in the Faryab province,
and then transferred him to Kabul. 79
The President has used this poorly-defined presidential pardon
power in his favor to pardon individuals, despite Afghan laws being
unclear on whether or how an individual can request a presidential
pardon. However, in practice, the President has issued many individual
pardons and released many criminals from prisons since 2004, under
the current Constitution. 80 For example, former President Hamid
Karzai granted individual pardons for three men who were convicted of
gang-raping a woman in the Samangan province. 81 The President
granted these pardons because the three men allegedly had a great
relationship with former President Karzai, one being a powerful local
village commander. 82
2. Administrative Corruption
Aside from political and security problems, Afghanistan’s
government faces various challenges related to corruption and
challenges that affect the process of creating a state. Afghanistan’s
government is dealing with threats to the “legitimacy” and stability of
its sovereignty and rule of law. 83 This broad and ill-defined pardon
power can cause not only political corruption but also administrative
78. Id.; see e.g. James Mackenzie, Powerful Afghan Regional Leader Ousted
As Political Picture Clouds, REUTERS https://mobile.reuters.com/article/
amp/idUSKBN1EC2E1 (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
79. Afghan Special Forces Arrest 25 Armed Locals in Faryab Over Militia
Dispute,
SALAAM
TIMES
(July
6,
2018),
http://afghanistan.asianews.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_st/newsbriefs/2018/07/06/newsbrief.
80. See e.g. Kate Clark, Afghan President Pardons Men Convicted of Bayonet
Gang Rape, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 24, 2008), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/asia/afghan-president-pardons-men-convicted-of-bayonet-gang-rape907663.html.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83.
Maíra Martini, Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in
Afghanistan,
TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
(Oct.
20,
2013),
https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/overview-of-corruption-and-anticorruption-in-afghanistan.
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corruption. When there is no specific procedure for implementing the
pardon power, corruption may arise among government employees,
especially employees dealing with the prisoners’ release.
In general, when the President issues a pardon decree, a committee
reviews cases and lists the prisoners who are eligible for commuted
sentences or pardons. 84 The lack of a central database or electronic
system gives this committee an unmonitored opportunity to consider
bribes, nepotism, and other relationships when choosing to add or delete
names from the list. 85 Realistically, when a powerful or wealthy
prisoner discovers who is on the committee, the committee could easily
add a name to the pardon list. 86 As long as someone is willing and able
to pay the fee or engage in other corrupt practices, the committee could
add their name on the pardon list. 87 For instance, the President’s
administrative office admittedly received many complaints about
corruption in the commission, which is authorized to consider
individuals eligible for pardon or punishment reduction. 88 The
complaints allege the commission considered individuals who did not
qualify for the benefits of pardon decrees ignoring individuals who
were qualified for pardons. 89 Esmatullah, a former prisoner who was
released from prison, said, “[i]f you know some officials or give money,
you will be released from prison within three to five months. Otherwise,
you will remain for two to three years.” 90

84. See 75 Uzwe Hezb-e Islami, supra note 26.
85. Supreme Council for the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Meeting, supra
note 72, at 5-6.
86. Nasima Walizada, Fasad Dar Ejrae Farman Ahai Resat Jamhouri
[Corruption in Implementing Presidential Pardon Orders], TKG.AF (2017),
http://tkg.af/ﻓﺮﻣﺎن-اﺟﺮای-در-ﻓﺴﺎد%E2%80%8Eﺟﻤﮫ-رﯾﺎﺳﺖ-ﻋﻔﻮ-ھﺎی/
87. See generally id.
88. Supreme Council for the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Meeting, supra
note 72, at 5-6. The President’s administration made its admission about corruption
complaints in the Minutes-of-Meeting-12 of Supreme Council for the Rule of Law
and Anti-Corruption.
89. Id.
90. Jawid Hasanzada, Qazi: Farman Reyasat Jamhore Bayad Balae Maboseen
Ba Tawre Yaksan Tatbeq Shawad [Qazi: ThePresidential Decree Should be Applied
RADIO
(May
25,
2014)
to
Prisoners
Alike],
AZADI
https://da.azadiradio.com/a/25397504.html.
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3. Problems with Broad Discretion
One of the improvements in the new Afghan Penal Code is the
introduction of grounds for rehabilitation of criminals. 91 These
provisions introduce alternatives to imprisonment, 92 reduction of
sentences, 93 and suspension of punishment. 94 These approaches are
consistent with general judiciary and government policies, and
international standards aimed at rehabilitative or restorative justice. 95
However, the improvements still provides for broad discretion, creating
substantial room for officials to disregard the law and undermine the
judiciary. 96 Judges are obligated to use their authority provided by the
legislature to ensure the purposes of the punishment are satisfied. 97
They also should consider the family, cultural, social, and economic
characteristics of the accused when they issue their verdict. 98 Judges
could use tools, such as the quality of the sentence and the suspension
of punishment, at the time the issuance verdict is issued. They could
use also use other tools that are dedicated to the stage after the issuance
of the ruling, such as conditional release. 99 Today, the penalty system
has been adopted at a minimum and a maximum in various legal

91.
92.

These provisions entered into force on February 14, 2018.
CODE JAZA [PENAL CODE], art. 148, THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
AFGHANISTAN 1260, 1396 [2017] (Afg.).
93. Id. arts. 207-16.
94. Id. arts. 221-36.
95. ZAMEMA-E SHOMARA 2 QANON-E EJRAHAT JAZAEE DAR MOWREDE
TATBEQ BADEL HAI HABS WA HAJZ [ANNEX (2) TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE TO IMPRISONMENT AND DETENTION], art. 1 THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN, EXTRAORDINARY ISSUE 1286, 1396 [2018]
(Afg.). [hereinafter Annex2 to ACPA]
96. UNAMA Welcomes Afghanistan’s New Penal Code - Calls for Robust
Framework to Protect Women Against Violence, UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN (Feb. 22, 2018), https://unama.unmissions.org/unamawelcomes-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-new-penal-code-calls-robust-frameworkprotect-women-against-violence.
97. See Annex2 to ACPA, supra note 95, art. 8.
98. Zarorat Ahmal Takhfif Dar Rastai Habszedaee/ Takhfif Dar Majazat
Nabayad Sababe Tajre Mojrem Showad [The need to grant pardon or reduce
punishment to release from imprisonment should not be caused extreme criminals],
yjc.ir, (May 4, 2014), https://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4826043/.
99. Id.
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systems. 100 Under this system, criminal judges are required to impose
a penalty below the statutory limitation or make a proportionate
penalty. 101
Although deterrence is a goal of punishment, the Afghan
government’s pardoning and reducing punishment policy 102 is a
releasing policy that decreases the number of prisoners to reduce the
cost of prisons. 103 This cost reduction can compensate for the injustices
that have been committed by the weak and corrupt judicial system.104
The Afghan Government seemingly adopts its releasing policy in
consideration for the country’s poor economy and corruption problems.
For the Afghan government to effectively implement its releasing
policy, it needs to create effective procedure and method.
Scholars who argue in favor of punishments aimed at deterrence
note that it prevents not only an individual criminal, but also other
criminals from committing crimes. 105 Therefore, the act of pardoning
and forgiving punishments should not eliminate the judiciary’s strength
and the importance and intimidation of the law.
In many cases, a criminal’s release through the pardon process has
undermined the judiciary’s strength and the law. The Sara case is one
of the obvious examples. In 2007, former president Hamid Karzai,
pardoned three men convicted of raping a woman in the Samangan.106
The rape victim, Sara, knew the President pardoned her rapists, who
were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for eleven years. 107
Sara’s husband, Dalawer, said, “[t]hese were men who had been
sentenced and found guilty by the Supreme Court, [are] walking around
freely.” 108 A copy Hamid Karzai’s pardon was issued in May,
recommending release of all three men because “they had been forced

100. See Annex2 to ACPA, supra note 95, art. 8.
101. Id.
102. Id. art. 1.
103. See generally The Purposes of Punishment, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA,
http://open.lib.umn.edu/criminallaw/chapter/1-5-the-purposes-of-punishment/ (last
visited Mar. 18, 2019).
104. Annex2 to ACPA, supra note 95.
105. The Purposes of Punishment, supra note 103.
106. Kate Clark, supra note 80.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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to confess to their crimes.” 109 However, no evidence exists to prove
that the three men had been forced to confess, and it is unlikely that
someone can obtain a forced confession from powerful commanders in
Afghanistan. 110 This pardon shows how unbridled authority can cause
problems and how authorized individuals can abuse power.
Accordingly, Lord Acton, a British politician in the nineteenth century
said, “[a]bsolute power corrupts absolutely.” 111
Therefore, the combined lack of a database on offenders, accurate
information, and definite procedures for pardons and punishment
reduction, along with weak government institutions have led to
corruption. Through this corrupt pardon process, many perpetrators are
released from prison every year without a careful examination of the
perpetrator’s records and status. This corrupt process threatens to
undermine the role of the judiciary and the rule of law.
D. Lack of Meaningful Separation of Powers
The 2004 Afghan Constitution, still in effect today, established the
Afghan government as a centralized presidential system with powers
separated into three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.112
The National Unity Government (“NUG”) was created to maintain
peace and stability after neither of the major candidates, Dr. Ashraf
Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, would concede defeat in the
controversial 2014 election. 113
The NUG is a power-sharing agreement under which both parties
play a role. 114 Under this agreement, the executive branch was divided

109. Id.
110. Id.
INSTITUTE,
111. Lord
Acton
Quote
Archive,
ACTON
https://acton.org/research/lord-acton-quote-archive (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
112.
See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], Ch. 3,
art 6.
113. Barnett R. Rubin & Georgette Gagnon, The U.S. Presence and
Afghanistan’s National Unity Government: Preserving and Broadening the Political
ON
INT.
COOPERATION
(Aug.
2016),
Settlement,
CTR
https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/national_unity_government_final.pdf.
114. Agreement Between the Two Campaign Teams Regarding the Structure of
the National Unity Government, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014),
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into two parts: (1) the President, Dr. Ghani, as Commander-in-Chief
and head of all three branches, and (2) the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO), Dr. Abdullah, as the head of the Council of Ministers. 115 The
NUG does not affect the President’s pardon power, because he remains
the only person with that power under Article 64 of the Afghan
Constitution.116 The President has this sole power under both
structures—the structure established under the Constitution and the
NUG.
1. Executive Power
Despite the separation of powers, the executive branch is much
more powerful than the other two branches. The President wields
overruling power over the two other branches, notably over Parliament,
because executive officials who are impeached by Parliament can
remain in their positions for several months or years, based on the
President’s order. 117 For example, in 2016, the Afghan Parliament
dismissed seven ministers 118 with no confidence votes, President Ghani

http://documents.latimes.com/agreement-between-two-campaign-teamsregardingstructure-national-unity-government/.
115. Id.
116.
See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 64.
117. Kevin Sieff, Karzai Approves Impeachment of Two Key Afghan Ministers,
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/asia_pacific/karzai-approves-impeachment-of-two-key-afghan-ministers/2012
/08/05/42db29c8-df00-11e1-a19c-fcfa365396c8_story.html?utm_term=.
fd0ddc5fa9c6.
118. The seven ministers are the following individuals: Salahuddin Rabbani,
the Minister of Foreign affairs; Mahmud Balegh, the Minister of Public Works; Nasrin
Oryakhel, the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled; Assadullah
Hanif Balkhi, the Minister of Education; Mohammadullah Batash, the Minister of
Transport and Civil Aviation; Farida Momand, the Minister of Higher Education; and
Abdul Razeq Wahidi, the Minister of Telecommunication. Thomas Ruttig.
Parliament Kicks Out Ministers Again: A Multi-Dimensional Power Struggle,
AFGHANISTAN ANALYSTS NETWORK (Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.afghanistananalysts.org/parliament-kicks-out-ministers-again-a-multi-dimensional-powerstruggle/.
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ordered “the dismissed ministers to remain in office, and asked the
Supreme Court to reverse the parliament’s decision.” 119
The President’s order allowed Salahuddin Rabbani, the dismissed
Minister of Foreign affairs, to remain in his post despite his formal vote
of no confidence. 120 Although the other six ministers have since left
their offices, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether
Parliament’s impeachments were constitutional. 121 Parliament argued
that Article 121 of the Afghan Constitution merely grants the Supreme
Court the authority “to review the constitutionality of laws. 122 Further,
Parliament argued Article 121 does not authorize the Court to decide
on the constitutionality of the Parliament’s appointment and removal
powers.” 123 As it seems, the Supreme Court, in considering the current
political situation, “has decided not to decide,” on this sensitive issue. 124
2. Legislative Power: Parliament
Afghanistan’s Parliament consists of two houses: (1) the Wolesi
Jirga (“House of Representatives”) and (2) the Meshrano Jirga (“House
of Elders”). 125 According to Afghanistan’s Constitution, a House of
Representatives member shall be elected for a five-year term through a

119. Shamshad Pasarlay, When Courts Decide Not to Decide: Understanding
the Afghan Supreme Court’s Struggle to Decide the Fate of the Dismissed Ministers,
ICONNECT BLOG (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/03/whencourts-decide-not-to-decide-understanding-the-afghan-supreme-courts-struggle-todecide-the-fate-of-the-dismissed-ministers/.
120. See, e.g., Catherine Putz, Power Struggle Continues Inside Afghan
Government, THE DIPLOMAT, (Nov. 29, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/
2016/11/power-struggle-continues-inside-afghan-government/; Massoud Ansar,
Ghani Accused of Violating Constitution, Disregarding Parliament, TOLO NEWS
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/ghani-accused-violatingconstitution-disregarding-parliament; Thomas Ruttig, Parliament Kicks Out
Ministers Again: A Multi-Dimensional Power Struggle, AFGHANISTAN ANALYSTS
NETWORK (Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/parliament-kicksout-ministers-again-a-multi-dimensional-power-struggle/.
121. Pasarlay, supra note 119.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF
AFGHANISTAN], THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 82.
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direct, transparent, and fair election. 126 Each province votes for a
representative, and the seats are allocated in proportion to a provinces’
population. 127
However, the House of Elders’ composition is different, because
the President selects one-third of its members for a five-year term. 128
The other two-thirds are elected through provincial councils for a fouryear term and district councils for a three-year term. 129 Both houses
have oversight powers over the executive branch by adopting laws. 130
The House of Representatives can also confirm the President’s
appointment of government ministers and heads of independent
offices. 131 Although both Houses do not have a direct role or check on
the President’s pardon power, they can indirectly limit this power by
adopting laws under Article 90 §1 of the Afghan Constitution.132
3. The Judicial Power and the Role of the Supreme Court
Under Afghanistan’s Constitution, the Supreme Court consists of
nine judges appointed by the President and confirmed by Parliament. 133
Due to the nature of judicial appointments, the executive and legislative
branch appear capable of influencing judiciary decisions. For example,
the President has used judicial review, one of the Supreme Court’s
important powers, against Parliament. 134
Under Afghanistan’s
Constitution, the Supreme Court has the authority to interpret the law
at the request of the President or lower courts. 135 This gives the
President substantial power over judiciary decisions because the
126. Id. art. 83.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 84.
130. Id. art. 90.
131. QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN],
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 91.
132. Id.
133. Id. art. 117.
134. Ghizaal Haress, Judicial Review in Afghanistan: A Flawed Practice,
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (Aug. 2017), https://areu.org.af/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/1722E-Judicial-Review-PN-1.pdf.
135. QANUNI ASSASI AFGHANISTAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN],
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 818, 1383 [2004], art. 121.
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President can simply request that the Supreme Court review laws that
do not benefit the President’s interests. Historically, the Supreme Court
has often interpreted the law in the President’s favor. 136 For instance,
when Parliament adopted the “Law on Issuance of Legislative
Decree,” 137 the President vetoed it and sent it back to Parliament.138
When Parliament ratified the law again with a two-thirds majority, the
President requested that the Supreme Court review the law’s
constitutionality. 139 The Supreme Court revoked the Law on Issuance
of Legislative Decree and emphasized the Executive Branch’s
position. 140 In this case, the Supreme Court of Afghanistan did not
decide independently, showing its inability to limit the President’s
powers, including the pardon power.
II. SEEKING IDEAS FOR REFORM: PARDON POWERS IN IRAN AND
WASHINGTON STATE
A. The Iranian Model
Historically, communities generally respond to crime with
punishment. Alongside punishment have been pardons, which have
existed since ancient times. 141 Those who committed crimes were
sometimes pardoned in cases that considered specific conditions. 142
Today, the pardon institution continues to maintain its status despite the

136. See generally QANUNI SODOR FARAMINE TAQNINE [LAW ON ISSUANCE OF
LEGISLATIVE DECREE], arts. 10-16, THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN 1285,
1396 [2018] (Afg.).
137. Id. at 1340-42.
138. Id. at 1396.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1406-1412.
141. See Dr. Ali Safari & Behnaz Rezai, Tahlile Bar Hainnama Kamison Haf
Wa Takhfif Majazat Makomen Musaweb 12/9/1387 Dar Muqahisa Ba Hainnama
Kamison Haf wa Takhfif wa Tabdel Mojazat Musaweg 16/5/1387 [An Analysis of
Regulation of the Pardoning and Reducing the Punishment of Convicts Adopted in
12/9/1387 Compared with the Regulation of the Pardoning, Reducing and Changing
the Punishment of Convicts adopted in 16/5/1387], 2 (2015),
http://lawmagazine.sbu.ac.ir/index.php/researchejuridique/article/view/978/978.
[hereinafter Analysis of Pardoning Regulation].
142. Id.
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existence of practices, such as: conditional release, different types of
punishment suspension, and alternative imprisonment and detention.143
Iran’s pardon laws are a model for reform because its laws have
been successful. Further, as an Islamic republic, Iran shares many
characteristics with Afghanistan’s system, particularly from a socialpolitical standpoint. Both countries follow a combination of civil and
Islamic law. 144 Like Afghanistan, Iran is a multicultural country with
many linguistic and ethnic groups. 145 According to the World
Factbook, 99.4% of Iran’s population are Muslim and the majority of
them are Shi’a. 146 Also, like Afghanistan, Iran’s official language is
Farsi. 147
Iran has a unique pardon system because the pardon power is vested
in the Revelation Leader rather than the President or other executive
authorities. 148 Iran’s system sets a good example for Afghanistan
because, like in Afghanistan, Iran’s legislation derives from Islamic law
and the Roman-German legal system. 149 In light of its current legal and
political structure, Iran pursues a specific policy of pardoning or
reducing punishment. 150 Meanwhile, Iran is also committed to
combatting corruption and has safeguards to prevent abuses of the
pardon power. 151 Further, a study of Iran could be useful for
Afghanistan because Iran has at least seventy-three years of legislative
experience in pardon law or regulation. 152

143. Id.
144. Parviz Owsia, Sources of Law under English, French, Islamic and Iranian
Law: A Comparative Review of Legal Techniques, 6 ARAB LAW QUARTERLY 33, 37
(1991); Abdul Satar Sirat, The Modern Legal System of Afghanistan, 16-4 THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 563, 569 (1968); ERYAND
ABRAHAMIAN, HISTORY OF MODERN IRAN 177 (Cambridge University Press (2008)).
145. Iran, CIA FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ir.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
146. Id. Shi’a is one of the main schools of Islam.
147. Id.
148. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] July 28, 1989, art. 110 § 11, 1368 (Ir.).
149. Parviz Owsia, supra note 144, at 67.
150. Analysis of Pardoning Regulation, supra note 141.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Before 1979, the Iranian system was secular. 153 After the 1979
revolution, Islam became Iran’s official religion. 154 The 1979
revolution overthrew the Pahlavi Dynasty’s constitutional monarcy in
Iran and replaced it with the Islamic Republic. 155 Then, Iran adopted a
constitution in 1979 that outlined its new system of governance; it was
later revised in 1989. 156 Iran’s 1989 Constitution created a combination
of parliamentary democracy and Islamic theocracy with Islamic jurists
holding a religious role under the Supreme Leadership Concept. 157
As the highest official authority, the Supreme Leader is accountable
to the Assembly of Experts and exercises his authority under Article
110 of Iran’s Constitution. 158 The Supreme Leader is also the
Commander-in-Chief and has control over armed forces, foreign and
domestic policies. 159 He also appoints or dismisses the Chief of Justice,
the head of the national radio and television, and the Commander of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 160 Additionally, he authorizes and
appoints six of the twelve members in the Council of Guardians. 161
Under the new Constitution, Iran’s president holds the secondhighest official position. 162 Iran’s president is elected for a term of four

153. The Structure of Power in Iran: An Overview of the Iranian Government
and Political System, FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/tehran/inside/govt.html (last visited May 27, 2018).
154. Greg Bruno, Religion and Politics in Iran, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (June 19, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/religion-and-politicsiran.
155. Iran, CIA FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ir.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
156. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] Dec. 3, 1979, art. 110 § 6, 1358 (Ir.).
157. See generally QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] July 28, 1989, [1368] (Ir.).
158. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (July 28, 1989), art. 110, 1368 (Ir.).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The Council of Guardians is a powerful body that has the authority to
oversee the activities of Parliament and determines which candidates are qualified to
run for public office. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (July 28, 1989), art. 110 § 6(a), art. 91 § 1, 1368 (Ir.).
162. Id. art. 113.
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years and can serve for two terms. 163 He also heads the executive
branch and inspires the implementation of the Constitution and
economic policies. 164 Iran’s president is accountable to the Iranian
people, the Supreme Leader, and the Islamic Council. 165
Iran’s Constitution establishes a Parliament consisting of 290
members who legislate and oversee the executive branch’s activities.166
Iran’s Parliament members serve four-year terms with the power to pass
laws and impeach ministers and the president. 167 All bills passed by
Iran’s Parliament are then reviewed by the Guardian Council. 168
The “Guardian Council,” or Shorai Negaban, consists of twelve
members. 169 Half of its members are theologians selected by the
Supreme Leader; the remaining members are nominated by the Chief
Justice and approved by parliament. 170 Guardian Council members are
elected for six-year terms and are responsible for reviewing all bills
passed by Iran’s Parliament. 171 Guardian Council members may also
“bar candidates from standing in elections for parliament, the
presidency and the Assembly of Experts.” 172
The judiciary is another important branch of the Iranian
government. The Supreme Leader appoints the Chief of Justice, or
Head of Judiciary, to oversee the implementation and enforcement of
Islamic laws and define legal policy. 173

163. Id. art. 114.
164. Id. art. 113, 114.
165. Id. art. 122.
166. Id. art. 64.
167. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (July 28, 1989), arts. 63, 71, 89, 1368 (Ir.).
168. Id. art. 94.
169. Id. art 91.
170. Id.
171. Id. art. 92
172. Guide: How Iran is Ruled, BBC NEWS (June 9, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8051750.stm.
173. Id; QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (July 28, 1989), art. 110 §6(b), 1368 (Ir.).
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Majlese Khebragan, or the Assembly of Experts, are authorized to
appoint or dismiss the Supreme Leader. 174 These clerics are elected for
eight-year terms and can nominate themselves. 175 The current
assembly has eighty-six members and holds two sessions each year. 176
1. History of Iran’s Pardon Power
Because the Quran recommends pardons, Iran’s Islamic
government considers pardons an important institution.177 Iran has
seriously applied the pardon institution in its criminal policy in
accordance with religious recommendations, historical references, and
social-political situations. 178
The pardon may be one of the oldest institutions in Iranian criminal
law, which reportedly began during the time of Cyrus the Great.179
Based on ancient Iranian books, Cyrus announced an amnesty after
capturing Babylonia. 180 The pardon has remained prominent in modern
and contemporary Iranian criminal law since before the Islamic
Revolution, dating back to the 1925 Penal Code. 181
Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran had the “Pardoning and
Forgiveness Commission Regulations.” 182 On October 20, 1945, the
Ministry of Justice approved these regulations through eight articles. 183
The regulation did not design ordinary meetings for the Pardoning and
Forgiveness Commission, but the General Penal Code requires the

174. QANUNI ENTEKHABAT WA HAIN NAMA-E DAKHILI MAJLESE KHEBRAGAN
[THE ELECTION ACT AND INTERNAL REGULATION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS],
art. 4, 1359 [1980] (Ir.).
175. Id.
176. Guide: How Iran is ruled, supra note 172.
177. THE HOLY QURAN, 2:178.
178. Analysis of Pardoning Regulation, supra note 141.
179. Id.
180. R.J. VAN DER SPEK, Cyrus the Great, Exiles and Foreign Gods A
Comparison of Assyrian and Persian Policies on Subject Nations, in Extraction &
Control 1, 1 (Michael Kozuh et al. eds, 2014).
181. Analysis of Pardoning Regulation, supra note 141, at 5.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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commission to be held at the Office of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of
Justice every four months. 184
On September 19, 1964, the Minister of Justice adopted another
regulation entitled “Regulations of the Pardoning and Forgiveness
Commission.”185 Set in eighteen articles, this new regulation required
the Pardoning and Forgiveness Commission to convene four meetings
every year, under the authority of the Chief of the Office of the
Justice. 186 This regulation was amended on July 14, 1975, and was
enforced with thirteen articles until Iran’s Islamic Revolution. 187
After the Islamic Revolution, Article 110 of the 1979 Iranian
Constitution governed the Supreme Leader’s duties and authority. 188
This article authorized the Supreme Leader to issue pardons or reduce
punishment through the Chief Justice’s recommendations and “within
the framework of Islamic criteria.” 189 When Iran amended its
Constitution in 1989, it continued to vest the Supreme Leader with
power to “pardon[] or reduc[e] the sentences of convicts . . . after the
head of the judiciary power has recommended such a motion.” 190
Iran’s Constitution ultimately gave the Supreme Leader pardon
power rather than its president. 191 Article 110 § 11 of Iran’s
Constitution authorized the Supreme Leader to reduce or pardon
convicted prisoners according to the Chief Justice’s request. 192 Iran
recognized this pardon power by adopting the Penal Code, the Criminal
Procedure Codes, and the Regulation of the Pardoning and Reducing
the Punishment of Convicts. 193 Article 96 of the Iranian Islamic
Criminal Code mirrors the language of the Constitution by stating,
184. Id. Article 55 of the General Penal Code provides that the Pardoning and
Forgiveness Commission must be held at the Office of Legal Affairs of the Ministry
of Justice every four months.
185. Id. at 4.
186. Id. at 5.
187. Id.
188. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] Dec. 3, 1979, art. 110, 1358 (Ir.).
189. Id. art. 110 § 6
190. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] (July 28, 1989), art. 110 § 11, 1368 (Ir.).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Analysis of Pardoning Regulation, supra note 141.
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“[p]ardon or mitigation of punishment of the convict, in accordance
with Islamic principles, is upon the proposal of the Head of Judiciary
and approval of the Leader.” 194 Thus, Iran’s Supreme Leader has
pardon power in Iran.
After 1979, the legislature emphasized the sources of Islamic law
in upholding the pardon institution.195 Consequently, on May 11, 1980,
the Supervisory Board of Ministry of Justice approved the first
“Pardoning and Forgiveness Regulation” in fourteen articles. 196
However, this regulation was abolished after nine months, when the
Supreme Judicial Council approved a new regulation based on Article
110 section 6 of the 1979 Constitution.197 The Pardoning Regulation
has since been amended five times. 198 In December 2008, the Head of
the Judiciary adopted the current “Pardoning and Forgiveness
Regulation” and made a Central Commission, combining five judges
with a provincial commission from each province to review pardon
requests. 199
2. Iran’s Mechanisms and Methods for Pardons or
Punishment Reductions
This section will illustrate Iran’s current mechanisms and methods
for issuing pardons at the central and provincial level. This section will
also discuss the Central and Provincial Commissions’ structure, and
how other organizations and administrations play a role in certain
aspects of pardon procedures. This discussion will identify how
Afghanistan should use Iran’s approach to prevent the abuse of
discretion and corruption that is infecting Afghanistan’s system.
Article 1 of Iran’s current Regulation of the Pardoning and
Reducing Punishment of the Convicts forms the Pardoning and
Reducing Punishment Commissions in the Central and Provincial
level. 200 These Commissions were designed to implement the authority
194.
(Ir.).
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

QANUNI MAJAZATE ISLAMI [THE ISLAMIC PENAL CODE], art. 96, 1392
Analysis of Pardoning Regulation, supra note 141, at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2,3.
Id. art. 1.
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provided in Article 110 paragraph 11 of the Iranian Constitution.201
The Central Commission is composed of five judges who should be
familiar with Islamic and ordinary law and have ten years judicial
experience. 202 Under this regulation, the Chief of Justice is authorized
to appoint the Central Commission members for five years and select
one member as head of the commission. 203 Although the member
selection process lacks democratic characteristics, the Central
Commission’s existence is considered a positive factor. The Central
Commission requires its meetings to maintain a quorum of at least three
members, and its decisions are validated with three votes. 204
Provincial Commissions are also formed based on the Iran’s current
Regulation of the Pardoning and Reducing Punishment of the
Convicts. 205 Provincial Commissions can hold their meetings and make
decisions with the presence of three members and a majority vote. 206 A
Provincial Commission consists of the General Head of the Provincial
Justice Department, a judiciary representative from the respective
province, the provincial prosecutor, and the Director General of the
province’s prisons. 207 Under this regulation, the following individuals
can request a pardon: the Head of the Justice Department, the
prosecutors, the judge of the prison observer, the prison chief, the
convicted person, and the convicted person’s family. 208 If either the
Central Commission or the Provincial Commission find the pardon or
punishment reduction request eligible, the Central Commission may
refer the request to the Supreme Court. 209 Once the Chief Justice
ratifies the pardon request, it is presented to the Supreme Leader for a
final decision. 210
During a formal meeting and evidence assessment, the Provincial
Commission determines whether an application for pardon or sentence
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 2, 3.
2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 3.
Id. art. 4
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 15.
2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 15.
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reduction is eligible. 211 If the appplication is eligible, the Provincial
Commission will send the Secratariat of the Central Commission its
reasons for accepting the application and a recommendation in a full
status report. 212 If the Provincial Commission finds a pardon or
reduction request ineligible, it will archive the request unless the Chief
Justice of Iran refers the request to the Central Commission for
consideration and final determination. 213 The Chief Justice’s ability to
interfere with requests shows how the Provincial Commissions do not
have the final authority to determine a pardon request. The Chief
Justice and the Central Commission can always decide to re-examine
pardon or reduction requests, which reduces the Provincial
Commissions’ significance and undermines their independence.
Iran’s pardon process shows its commitment to efficiency. Iran’s
current pardon regulation made the Information Office, Counter
Narcotics Department, and other relevant departments responsible for
answering all official requests from the Central and Provincial
Commissions.214 Both the Central and Provincial Commissions
conduct meetings every fifteen days and anticipate fourteen occasions
for implementing the pardon and reducing punishment in the Pardon
Regulation. 215 This frequency and efficiency shows the Iranian
government’s serious and decisive commitment to release the
prisoners. 216
If the Provincial Commission reviews and finds pardon requests
eligible, it will make a list and send their decision to the Central
Commission one month before the deadline. 217 These decisions come
with the Provincial Commission’s recommendations and explanations
for an applicant’s eligibility for pardon or punishment reduction. 218 The
Provincial Commission cannot send its decisions directly to the

211. Id. art. 8.
212. Id. The full status report provides information on the status of convicts in
the province.
213. Id.
214. Id. arts. 7, 10, 22.
215. Id. art. 15.
216. 2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 15.
217. See id.
218. Id.
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Supreme Court. 219 This means the Central Commission reviews all lists
provided by Provincial Commissions throughout Iran. Then, the
Central Commission sends the eligible pardon or punishment reduction
lists to the Supreme Court, which forwards all the lists to the Supreme
Leader for ratification. 220
The Central Commission also makes two lists noting the following:
(1) prisoners who are eligible for pardons, and (2) prisoners who are
eligible for punishment reduction. 221 Pardoned prisoners are released
as soon as possible, and a releasing report is sent back to the Central
Commission, ten days after the pardon issued. 222 This shows efficiency
in Iran’s process. Further, if pardons for convicted persons lack
conditions, the Chief of Justice can offer the convicted person a pardon
concurrently by mentioning preferred causes or justifiable reasons,
which also undermines the Central and Provincial Commissions’
independency and role. 223
3. Lessons from the Iranian Approach
The Iranian approach shows a pardon should not undermine
judicial authority, and that an effective and qualified body should
carefully examine a pardon request to ensure unrehabilitated persons
are not released from prison. 224 Although Afghanistan’s Constitution
gives the President pardon power, its lack of procedure undermines the
judiciary system’s role and fosters corruption. By considering Iran’s
model, Afghanistan can adopt a pardon institution to stop corruption
and the abuse of power, and implement laws that ensure respect for
judicial decisions and the rule of law.
Iran’s approach is also an effective model because it allows
prisoners and their relatives to request pardons through specified
procedures. 225 Unfortunately, Afghanistan’s laws do not provide a
specific right to seek pardon and they do not explicitly explain how a

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 16.
Id. art. 17.
Id. art. 20.
Id. art. 24 § 10.
2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 1.
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person petitions for a pardon. By establishing an official mechanism
for pardon requests, Iran’s approach reduces the need for unofficial
dealings and requests, which could be corrupted by bribes and favors.
Therefore, Afghanistan should recognize the fundamental right to
request pardons by adopting a regulation or amending the ACPA.
Afghanistan could even amend its Constitution to recognize pardon
petition rights and limit the President’s pardon power.
However, Iran’s regulation on pardon power does have some
weaknesses. While having authority to appoint Commission members,
the Chief Justice also has the power to recommend pardons to the
Supreme Leader. 226
The Chief Justice can make these
recommendations even if the petition does not meet the circumstances
provided in the regulation. 227 This Iranian approach may undermine
the commissions’ independence.
Moreover, the Provincial
Commissions’ decisions may be overturned by the Central
Commission, which undermines the Provincial Commissions’ authority
and independence.
B. The Washington State Model
Although Washington State’s laws and society vastly differ from
Afghanistan, aspects of Washington’s pardon law could be a helpful
model for Afghanistan. Despite the socio-political differences,
Washington State offers Afghanistan some sound practices and model
rules. Washington State provides detailed directions for its pardoner
and specifies clear legal methods for carrying out pardons or reducing
punishments. These processes can be adapted to Afghanistan’s
conditions and legal system.
1. Brief History of Pardon Power in the U.S.
Although the pardon power is an ancient principle, the logic and
rationale behind this practice remains a controversial issue among
scholars. 228 All legal practices are created in communities for specific
226. Id. art. 2, 15
227. Id. art. 20.
228. Kristen H. Fowler, Limiting the Federal Pardon Power, 83 IND. L.J. 1651,
1653 (2008), https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1287&context=ilj.
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purposes and are justified through logic and reason. The pardon power
is also a practice that has been created based on society’s needs. The
pardon power was incorporated into the United States Constitution by
following England’s common law. 229 When the United States
Constitution was ratified, the pardon power was one of the United
States President’s “least limited” powers. 230 Although many people
questioned the practice of presidential pardons, its supporters
highlighted the rationale behind its existence. 231 Alexander Hamilton
emphasized the need for pardons in his Article No 74. 232
Although this article does not intend to discuss the rationale behind
the pardon power, this issue must be discussed in order to understand
the value of the pardon practice in the United States. 233 The logic and
rationale behind each practice can vary among societies, but the pardon
power generally fulfills four useful functions: (1) to reverse wrongful
convictions; (2) to eliminate punishments that are not commensurate
with the crime committed; (3) to “restore national unity, either by
ending a conflict or by forgiving the losers,” 234 and (4) to use the power
as a political and “foreign policy tool to satisfy foreign leaders.” 235
29F

230F

231F

23F

2. Pardons Under the Washington State Constitution, the Revised
Code of Washington State, and Clemency Bylaws of the Clemency and
Pardoning Board
Following the United States Constitution, various American States
vest pardon authority or competence in their governors. In 1878, when
the territory of Washington was trying to achieve statehood in the

229. Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential
Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 782 (1996-1997).
230. See William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional
&
MARY
L.
REV.
475,
523
(1977),
History,
18
W M.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/3.
231. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers: No. 74: The Command of the
Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive From the New
York Packet (Mar. 25, 1788), THE AVALON PROJECT—LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW
LIBRARY, YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed74.asp.
232. Id.
233. Fowler, supra note 228.
234. Id. at 1653-54.
235. Id.
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United States, 236 a convention tried to ratify a proposed constitution.237
However, after failing to get the United States Congress’s endorsement,
the Washington territory could not ratify its constitution and get state
recognition. 238 Although the attempt was unsuccessful, the proposal
took the pardon power into consideration. 239
In 1889, Washington drafted another Constitution, which was a
comparative study of various State constitutions. 240 This draft was sent
to Congress for ratification and State recognition. 241 Through the
Washington Constitution’s ratification, Washington became the 42nd
State of America. 242 Washington State’s Constitution vested pardon
power in its State Governor under article three section nine. This article
section is identical to the provisions in Washington State’s draft
Constitution of 1878243 and the Hill Constitution. 244
While Washington’s 1889 Constitution was being drafted, two
opposing views disputed the placement of pardon power. 245 One view
wanted to give pardon power to a Governor’s Council, which would
work along with the Governor. 246 Others disagreed with this position
and argued that the constitution “already permitted the legislature to
experiment and this prerogative would be eliminated under the
amendment.” 247 Two representatives, George Turner and Allen Weir,
emphasized that “the pardoning power should be placed in a single

236. The territory of Washington was not recognized as a state of the United
States in 1878.
237. Elizabeth Gibson, First Washington Constitutional Convention convenes
in Walla Walla on June 11, 1878., HISTORY LINK (Mar. 7, 2006),
http://historylink.org/File/7648.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Arthur S. Beardsley, Sources of the Washington State Constitution,
Preface to THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, 2011-2012, LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 402,
https://lib.law.uw.edu/waconst/sources/LegManBeardsley.pdf
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. WASH. CONST. 1878, Art. VIII, Sec. 5.
244. Beardsley supra note 240, Hill, Art. V, Sec 9.
245. QUENTIN SHIPLEY SMITH, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, 569 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., 1999).
246. Id.
247. Id.
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person who then would be responsible and be more likely not to abuse
this power.” 248 The first group lost, receiving only three votes. 249
Based on the pardon power provided in the Washington State
Constitution, the Revised Code of Washington (“RCW”) authorizes the
State Governor to grant pardons or reduce punishment. 250 The RCW
even allows the State Governor to issue an extraordinary release. 251
The RCW also establishes a Clemency and Pardons Board (“Board”)
within the Governor’s Office. 252
Washington State’s Constitution authorizes the Governor to grant
pardons, but it also permits the legislature to limit this power through
legislation. In article III section nine, Washington State’s Constitution
states, “the pardoning power shall be vested in the governor under such
regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law.” 253 Under this
Article, legislatures may restrict the pardon power by passing statutes.
Under the RCW’s section 9.94A.880, “[t]he clemency and pardons
board is established as a board within the office of the governor.” 254
The Board “ shall receive petitions from individuals, organizations, and
the department for review and commutation of sentences and pardoning
of offenders in extraordinary cases, and shall make recommendations
thereon to the governor.” 255 Based on the RCW, the Board reviews
pardon requests and recommends eligible pardon requests to the
governor. 256 The Board can also receive pardon requests from
individuals or organizations, who lost their civil rights because of
“committed federal offenses or out-of-state felonies.” 257 However, the
RCW’s establishes procedural limitations by stating, “[t]he board shall
not recommend [to] governor [to] grant clemency . . . until a public
hearing has been held on the petition.” 258 This RCW provision

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
Id.
WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.728 (1974).
Id.
WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.880 (1974).
WASH. CONST. art. III, § 9.
WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.880 (1974).
WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.885 (1974).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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indirectly limits the Board and the governor’s power by preventing the
Board from recommending pardons and the governor from granting
pardons without a hearing process, which is clearly mentioned in the
Bylaws. 259
3. Clemency and Pardons Board: A Closer Look
The Clemency and Pardons Board is established as a committee
within the Governor’s Office. 260 The Board consists of five members
who are appointed by the governor and approved by the Senate for fouryear terms. 261 They choose their chairman and vice-chairman, and
adopt bylaws to manage all pardon procedures and processes. 262
According to the Board’s bylaws, the Department of Corrections,
organizations, and every individual can request a pardon review or
commutation sentences. 263 The Board must hold quarterly hearings, 264
but the Governor, the Board’s Chairperson, or a Board majority can
request a special hearing at any time. 265
Notably, the Governor has authority to either accept a Board
recommendation or reject it. 266 The Board uses specific steps to
determine whether to recommend a pardon case to the Governor. 267
Before the Board conducts a hearing, a pardon petition is reviewed
by the “Preliminary Review Committee,” which consists of two Board
members. 268 According to the Board’s bylaws, the Chairman
authorizes “Preliminary Review Committees” to determine “whether a
petition will [provide] for hearing to the full Board.” 269 If one

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See id.
WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.880 (1974).
Id. §§ 1, 2.
Id. § 3.
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, BYLAWS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, art. 1 § 2 (Mar. 22, 2011).
264. Id. art. 3 § C.
265. Id. art. 3 § C.
266. Washington Clemency & Pardons Board Policies, supra note 17. at 1.
267. CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, BYLAWS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, arts. 2 § 11, 3 §§ 1-2 (Mar. 22, 2011).
268. Id. art 3.
269. Id. art. 2 § 11.
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Preliminary Review Committee member votes in favor of the pardon
petition, the Board will conduct a full hearing. 270
The Board conducts regular and special hearings. Regularly
hearings are held quarterly and are open to every individual. 271 Special
hearings can only be held when “[t]he Governor, the Board’s
Chairperson, or a majority of the Board may call.” 272 After the
Preliminary Review Committee agrees to conduct a hearing, the full
Board hears the parties’ statements and presentations. 273 After the
Board hears all statements, it deliberates and decides whether or not to
recommend a pardon petition to the Governor. 274 During public hearing
deliberations, each Board member will vote and explain his or her
reasons for the recommendation. 275 Then, the Board will submit a nonbinding recommendation to the Governor. 276
4. Lessons from the Washington Approach
Washington’s policies and general approach provide a good model
for criminal rehabilitation and generally promote justice, including the
rule of law. Most importantly, Washington’s model shows how a
government can strengthen and support its justice institutions, while
pardoning individuals whose presence in prison is not necessary.
Washington’s approach allows prisoners to rejoin the community with
encouragement and forgiveness. Unlike Afghanistan, Washington’s
approach provides clear checks on executive power, and prevents
corruption. Afghanistan may benefit to set up an independent board,
like the Washington Clemency and Pardoning Board, to review pardons
or reduce punishment requests. Afghanistan could also emulate
Washington’s pardon process by processing pardon requests at the
central level.

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Washington Clemency & Pardons Board Policies, supra note 17, at 3.
Id. art. 3 §§ 1, 2.
Id. art. 3 § 2.
Id. art. 2 § 11.
Id. art. 1 § 2.
Washington Clemency & Pardons Board Policies, supra note 17, at 5.
Id.
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III. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE AFGHAN APPROACH
ON PARDONS
Despite their differences, both Iran and Washington State have
clear and detailed laws and procedures that could help Afghanistan’s
legislators seek solutions to corruption and to the President’s abuse of
pardon power. First, the Afghan Constitution should modify the scope
and purpose of the President’s power to pardon convicted criminals.
Second, the ACPA should define the limits on the President’s pardon
power and establish The Board of Pardoning and Reducing Punishment
(the “Pardon Board”). Finally, to implement this power and authority,
Afghanistan will need a regulation that particularly describes the
pardon process’s methods and mechanisms, as well as the structure and
authority of the Pardon Board.
To implement the above suggestions, Afghanistan’s Government
first needs to amend its Constitution to modify and limit the scope of
the President’s pardon power. Then, Afghanistan needs to enact
statutes that modify the Constitutional pardon power and establish an
independent board that defines the scope of the President’s pardon
power. Finally, the Afghan Government needs to authorize the Pardon
Board to recommend pardons or punishment reductions to the President
in accordance with regulations passed by the Pardoning Board.
A. Amending Afghanistan’s Constitution to Modify the Scope and
Purpose of the President’s Pardon Power
This article recommends for Afghanistan to amend Article 64 §18
of its Constitution to clarify the President’s pardon power, like
Washington State. Currently, Afghanistan’s Constitution authorizes
the President to grant pardons or reduce punishments, but its broad
language fails to provide specific processes and procedures. This
language should be specifically changed to narrow and define the scope
of the President’s power. Further, Afghanistan should establish a
pardon board and enact statutes that details the process and mechanism
for pardons. Afghanistan’s Constitution should also incorporate
provisions that permit every individual or convicted relative to request
pardons or punishment reductions. Finally, Afghanistan should pass an
amendment to authorize the House of Representatives to ratify and
impeach members of the Pardon Board. By making these changes,
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Afghanistan can limit presidential corruption through the pardon
power.
B. Amending the Afghan Criminal Procedure Act to Define the Limits
of the President’s Pardon Power
Like Washington’s approach, an ACPA amendment should be
adopted to establish the Pardon Board and modify procedures,
clarifying who can request a pardon under specific conditions and
circumstances. Following Iran and Washington’s approach, the ACPA
should allow every individual, his relatives, and his attorney to seek
pardons or punishment reductions. Afghanistan should amend ACPA
article 348, which states, “[a] pardon shall be carried out by the decree
of the president,” and change it to Washington’s approach. This
approach would change Afghanistan’s system by providing the Pardon
Board sole authority to recommend a pardon and the President may only
ratify or reject it. 277 Finally, like Washington’s Revised Code, the
ACPA should authorize the Pardon Board to adopt regulations that
specifically outline all pardon procedures and mechanisms, and the
duties and responsibilities of Pardon Board members.
To accomplish all the above recommendations, the second section
of Article 348 must also be amended. As stated above, this section
states, “[a] pardon shall not dismiss consequential and complementary
punishments and security measures and consequences of criminal
charges and does not affect previously applied punishments unless the
issued pardon decree states otherwise.” 278 This language should be
changed because it gives the President broad authority and allows him
to abuse his power. Furthermore, this language has blurred the
distinctions between pardon and restoring prestige. Restoring the
prestige under Afghanistan’s laws means a person convicted “due to a
felony or misdemeanor may be eligible” to request to restore their
prestige “after full enforcement of the . . . punishment or being
pardoned.” 279 The Court only grants this restoration for felonies after
six years and for misdemeanors after three years. 280 Therefore, the
277.

Washington Clemency & Pardons Board Policies, supra note 17 art. 3 §§

278.
279.
280.

See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 348 § 2.
Id. art. 362.
Id.

1, 2.
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language in ACPA’s article 348 section 2 authorizes the President to
pardon “previously applied punishments” by issuing a pardon decree
which “states otherwise.” Therefore, this language should be amended
to prevent the president from further imposing his authority over the
judiciary.
C. Creating a Pardon and Punishment Reduction Board
In accordance with modifying Afghanistan’s Constitution and
ACPA, the Pardon Board should be empowered to establish rules that
define who may examine pardon cases and how punishment should be
reduced. The Pardon Board should also have authority to determine
whether a pardon should be recommended to the President in a way that
does not undermine the judiciary system.
Pardon Board
recommendations should also focus on helping a convicted person
return as a productive member of society.
Through these
recommendations, the Board could arrange for and ratify regulations,
administrative structures, professional and administrative meetings,
and plans and strategies. The authority would permit the Pardon Board
to effectively implement pardons and punishiment reductions.
However, the Pardon Board’s regulations should clearly state how
pardon cases should be examined, how many ordinary meetings should
occur every year, what circumstances can convict, and how other
involved parties bring petitions to the Pardon Board.
Moreover, Pardon Board regulations should also clarify the duties
and responsibilities of the Pardon Board’s members, the conditions for
member dismissal, and the appointment of a Pardon Board member.
Like Washington’s approach, the regulations should also consider the
members’ right to vote and how it should be excercised, and the process
for policy-making.
Lastly, to successfully implement all these recommendations,
Afghanistan’s Board should have a legal structure with knowledgeable
members, a defined authority, a specific policy-making mechanism.
1. Structure and Framework
Afghanistan’s Pardon Board structure should involve two tiers.
The first tier should be modeled after Washington’s Board, as an
independent board in the capital city of Kabul (the “Central Board”).
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The second tier should be modeled after Iran’s Provincial Commissions
which are set in each of the provinces (the “Provincial Board”).
Like Washington’s approach, Afghanistan’s Central Board
members could be nominated by the President, Council of Ministers or
the President’s Cabinet. Then, the Wolesi Jirga, or House of
Representatives, will ratify the Board nominations. Afghanistan’s
Central Board could have seven members. Like Washington, the
Central Board members could choose their chairman and vice-chairman
among their members. However, the chairman and vice-chairman’s
terms should be limited to one year, which is slightly different from
Washington because it is not clearly mentioned in the Washington
Board’s bylaws. Additionally, the Central Board would have ordinary
meetings on occasional events that are clearly laid out in the ACPA. 281
This is again slightly different from Washington, because the
Washington Board consists of five members that hold ordinary
meetings quarterly. 282
As for provincial commissions, each province could have five
members who are nominated by the Central Board and ratified by the
President. This is slightly different from Iran’s model because the
Iran’s regulation states that the provincial commission’s members are
selected from local officials. 283 Afghanistan’s Provincial Board, like
the Central Board, should also choose their chairman and vice-chairman
for a one-year term. The Provincial Board’s decisions may be sent to
the Central Board for uniformity. From there, both boards’ decisions
could be sent to the President.
The proposed process for Afghanistan would be partially similar
and partially different from Iran’s model. In Iran, the Provincial
Commission sends their decision to the Central Commission for
uniformity, then the Central Commission refers the decision to the
Supreme Leader, not the President. 284 However, both of Afghanistan’s
Central and Provincial Boards could have administrative support that
prepares documents and evidence for the Board and informs all parties
about the hearing process and meetings. This administrative support
system would emulate Washington and Iran’s models.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See 2014 Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 6, art. 354 (1-5).
WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.880 (1974).
2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 4.
Id. art. 15.
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2. Qualification and Selection of Members
The Central Board’s members could be nominated by the President,
Council of Ministers or Cabinet. This nomination could be ratified by
House of Representative for a term of three years. However, Central
Board members should have at least five years of judicial experience
and have a bachelor’s degree in civil law or Sharia Law.
The Iranian and Washington State models have several similarities
and differences with regard to nominations. In Washington, the
Governor nominates Board members for four-year terms and the Senate
ratifies the Governor’s nomination. 285 Washington’s Board only
requires its members to be a registered voter in the State. 286 In contrast,
the Iran Central Commission members need to serve as judges for at
least ten years and they must be familiar with Islamic law. 287 Moreover,
the Chief of Justice selects Iran’s Central Commission members. 288
Washington State’s approach should be a good model for
Afghanistan’s Central Board. Similarly, Afghanistan’s Central Board
should nominate the Provincial Boards’ members to the President, but
the Provincial Board’s members should also have the same
qualifications as the Central Board. After the President ratifies a
Provincial Board member’s nomination, that member may work
independently. This would be different from Iran’s model, where
regulations sets forth the Provincial Commission’s member selection
process.
3. Authority and Responsibility
Like Washington and Iran’s laws, the ACPA and Pardon Board
regulations should govern the authority and responsibilities of the
Pardon Board members. Generally, the ACPA or Board regulations
would authorize the Pardon Board to review all pardons or punishment
reduction requests on special occasions or events. Under either the
ACPA or Pardon Board Regulations, the Pardon Board would also

285.
286.

WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.880 (1974).
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, BYLAWS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CLEMENCY AND PARDONS BOARD, art. 2 § 4 (Mar. 22, 2011).
287. 2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2.
288. Id. arts. 2, 3.
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consider the particular and specific circumstances that are proper or
improper to recommend pardons to the President.
In Iran and Washington, commissions and boards are responsible
for hearing pardon or punishment reduction petitions at specified time
periods before recommending them to the authorized person.
Washington’s board holds its hearings quarterly; 289 while Iran’s
commissions hold their meetings every fifteen days. 290 These models
will be different from the recommendations for Afghanistan, because
ACPA specifies five events that permit the President to issue pardons
or punishment reductions. Therefore, the Pardon Board may hold their
meetings according to ACPA’s provisions.
To maintain authority, Pardon Board members must have
independence. The President must not have the power to dismiss
Pardon Board members unless the members commit a crime. The
Pardon Board may hear all types of pardon and clemency cases.
However, Pardon Board members will not receive a salary for their
services. Instead, Afghanistan’s government will pay for their
transportation when they come for regular or special meetings. This is
also like the Washington Clemency Board.
4. The Board’s Pardon Process
Washington State and Iran are also great models for the Pardon
Board’s procedures. Washington State’s Board has a preliminary
committee within that is responsible to review the petitions before a full
board hearing. This design provides Afghanistan with a very important
model for its own pardon or punishment reduction process.
Further, by amending Afghanistan’s law to emulate Iran and
Washington State, any convicted person may have the right to ask for
pardons or punishment reductions. Like Washington and Iran’s laws,
convicted persons must have the right to file a petition requesting for
either a pardon or punishment reduction. Like Washington’s approach,
petitioners should be able submit their petitions to the Pardon Board at
least one month before the scheduled hearing dates, which are specified
events under the ACPA. The Preliminary Committee could review all
documents and match the pardons or punishment reductions with

289.
290.

Bylaws of Clemency and Pardons Board, supra note 17, art. 3 § 7.
2008 Iranian Pardoning Regulation, supra note 9, art. 15.
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conditions or circumstances. Then, if the petitions meet the conditions
or at least provide all the necessary documents, the Preliminary
Committee will recommend the pardons to the entire Pardon Board for
a hearing.Like Washington’s approach, the board will publicly hold the
meeting and decide whether to recommend a pardon.
5. The Possible Challenges
This approach potentially could face many challenges, including
concerns about the President and executive officials losing power and
authority. President Ghani believes in a strong and powerful central
government, and he has emphasized this position by criticizing other
governments and powers. Therefore, President Ghani will not accept
any idea that would limit the pardon power. Corrupt officials also will
try to prevent regulatory mechanisms on the pardon power because such
mechanisms will prevent them from engaging in corruption or abusing
the pardon power. Moreover, some people will challenge any proposal
that advocates for individuals to work without a salary. Finally,
Afghanistan’s corrupt and unjust judiciary system would either prevent
or at least hinder any proposal to modify pardon procedures.
CONCLUSION
Throughout human history, “pardon and forgiveness” has been
recognized through religion, custom, social principles, and sociopolitical norms. In the field of legislation, some scholars believe the
recognition of pardons can be traced from Hammurabi’s Code to the
laws of the United Kingdom and the United States of America. In
Islamic countries, the source of pardon and forgiveness has been tied to
religious teachings. The Qur’an explicitly recommends the use of
pardon and forgiveness. Although the pardon power has been
associated with compassion and kindness, this power has been used for
the social and political interests of rulers, like kings and presidents in
Afghanistan.
Over the past eigtheen years, the pardon power has undermined the
rule of law and has occassionally eradicated judicial systems. The
pardon system is necessary in every society, especially in places like
Afghanistan where there is a corrupt and weak judicial system.
Therefore, socieites must take into account the legitimate use of
pardons.
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Although the Afghanistan Constitution authorizes the President to
use pardons, he has not been able to regulate this power. Thus, by
amending Afghanistan’s Constitution and the ACPA, Afghanistan can
regulate the presidential pardon power. The amendments should
specify the crimes that the President can pardon and create a body that
examines pardon requests and determines which offenders are ready for
prison release.
To improve its pardon process, Afghanistan should establish
committees and procedures based on Iran and Washington State’s
model. Iran and Washington State’s procedures effectively prevent the
pardon power from being used for corruption. Without corruption, the
pardon power cannot undermine Afghanistan’s judicial system.
Further, an efficient pardon system allows the release of individuals
who do not need to be in prison anymore, decreasing government
spending. Afghanistan can become a more efficient and prosperous
country by simply amending its procedures for pardons and punishment
reductions.
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